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After the end of the Cold War, new visions about the future of world 
politics proliferated. Among them 
Samuel Huntington’s article about the 
clash of civilizations has been one of 
the most popular. In this seminal work 
a civilization is defi ned as “the highest 
cultural grouping of people.” Econom-
ic modernization and social change 
weakens local identities and thus cre-
ates conditions for the emergence of 
civilizations. Because the values in 
these civilizations are so disparate and 
the world is becoming a smaller place, 
it is argued that, the clash of the values 
and interests of eight major civiliza-
tions becomes inevitable. According 
to Huntington, micro-level confl icts 
occur between groups along the fault 
lines between civilizations, while mac-
ro-level struggle will happen between 
the states from different civilizations. 
The crux of Huntington’s argument is 
that the primary causes of confl icts will 
not be ideological or economic. “The 
great divisions among humankind and 
the dominating source of confl ict will 
be cultural.”2 Developing his argument 
in this vein, he derives certain implica-
tions and suggestions for Western poli-
cy, which has made the article a subject 
of intense controversy since the time of 
its publication.
This essay (article) does not under-
take the venturesome task of analyz-
ing the article in the realm of ethics, 
its pessimistic vision about the future 
of the world and its simplistic views 
of non-Western parts of the world. 
Instead, it endeavors to gauge the ar-
ticle’s social-scientifi c value using 
three benchmarks. For brevity, we will 
peruse Huntington’s core statements 
without going into details. First, we 
will look at how clearly and consis-
tently the concepts were defi ned. Then, 
we will show examples of ambiguities 
and fallacies in Huntington’s logic that 
makes his later hypotheses untenable. 
Lastly, some empirical fi ndings will 
be cited to demonstrate that Hunting-
ton’s predictions are not supported by 
research. While Huntington includes 
some information that covers a part of 
the reality in international affairs, his 
interpretation of that reality is inad-
equate and he fails to convince its care-
ful readers because of his ill-defi ned 
concepts and biased usage of data.
If civilization is defi ned according 
to certain criteria in one case, the same 
criteria must be used consistently in all 
cases covered by this conceptual frame-
work. However, in the article, the criteria 
for the defi nition of civilizations seem to 
be chosen arbitrarily. In one case the cri-
terion seems to be religion, but in another 
it is common history. If we look at the list 
of civilizations provided by Huntington 
we see this clearly: Western, Confucian, 
Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Ortho-
dox, Latin American. Interestingly, in the 
cases of Western and Latin American it is 
diffi cult to understand why they belong 
to different civilizations. No reason is 
given for not calling Japanese civiliza-
tion Shinto civilization according to the 
widespread religion practiced in Japan. 
What is more, there is no place in Hun-
tington’s classifi cation for countries like 
Cambodia, Mongolia, and Thailand, with 
large Buddhist populations. Even if we 
accept a common history as a criterion 
we can hardly say that Slavic-Orthodox 
peoples of Serbs, Macedonians, and 
Bulgarians have much in common with 
Ukrainians, Russians in Kazakhstan and 
Russia. If we take common values as the 
criteria to defi ne civilizations then it be-
comes necessary to study the values of 
communities in a civilization. For ex-
ample, in the case of Islamic civilization 
it cannot be argued that Kazakhs have 
same values as Arabs. 
By and large, this arbitrary style of 
defi ning basic concepts is maintained 
throughout the article. The perils of 
such an approach are explained in an 
article by Rogers Brubaker and Freder-
ick Cooper, where they argue that “the 
social sciences and humanities have 
surrendered to the word ‘identity’.”3 
They claim that mere popular usage of 
a term in daily life and politics does not 
justify its employment as an analytical 
category in social sciences. We think 
Huntington’s “civilizational identity” 
is an archetype of such ill-defi nition. 
He used it without providing clear 
guidelines how to defi ne it, how to fi nd 
civilizations in real life.4
Trying to interpret Huntington’s 
arguments leads us to another vantage 
point, from which we can evaluate his 
work. While he selectively mentions 
major transformations in international 
affairs to explain why civilizations 
will clash, in fact, he does not eluci-
date what the object of clash is, culture 
or power. While in the fi rst section 
he clearly states that “the dominating 
source of confl ict will be cultural,”5 
he later adds that “states from differ-
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ent civilizations compete for relative 
military and economic power.”6 This 
results in at least two different inter-
pretations. First is that, states and com-
munities in different civilizations will 
clash to protect their distinct identities, 
giving up their particular economic and 
military interests. Second interpreta-
tion is that civilizations share common 
values, but they will clash for power. 
We think choosing one substantially 
changes the logic of argument. If it is 
power, then it means that two actors 
from a civilization can have confl icts 
if their interests contradict. However, 
Huntington does not explain why cul-
tural confl icts dominate other types of 
confl icts. 
In the example of the statement 
that “Islam has bloody borders,” one 
can easily see how Huntington uses an 
incomplete picture of reality to defend 
his ideas. In fact, many confl icts on the 
edges of Islamic civilization are not 
directly related to civilizational issues. 
For example, the confl ict over Nago-
rno-Karabakh has nothing to do with 
Armenians belonging to the West and 
Azeris to Islamic world. It is mainly 
a territorial dispute. Therefore, “Islam 
has bloody borders,” not because it 
acts as a civilization but because it is 
a religion which is spread over a larger 
geographical area in Africa, Asia, and 
Europe. 
Another important shortcoming of 
Huntington’s logic is that his argument 
is partly a self-fulfi lling prophecy, an 
approach unacceptable in the social sci-
ences. In the last part of the article he 
outlines the main implications for the 
West and makes suggestions for Western 
policy. The author fi rst tries to convince 
his readers that the clash will occur, but 
also encourages actors to participate in 
the clash.7 It is like suggesting someone 
to fi ght because one thinks that people 
are likely to fi ght each other in future. 
This manner of fallacious reasoning is 
ubiquitous in the article, which makes 
it to a great extent a fragile conceptual 
framework.
In addition to the conceptual and 
logical shortcomings, many studies 
demonstrated that Huntington’s 
hypotheses are not supported by 
empirical evidence. Moreover, some 
studies show that it is diffi cult to 
apply his concepts to reality, to test 
if his hypotheses are plausible. A 
study conducted by Jonathan Fox has 
revealed that civilizational confl icts 
account for only a minor share of 
ethnic confl icts both during and after 
the Cold War.8 Another investigation 
by Errol Henderson and Richard 
Tucker also found no substantiation 
for Huntington’s hypotheses. For 
example, they have not found any 
“statistically signifi cant relationship 
between civilizational membership 
and interstate war.”9 Bruce M. Russett, 
John R. Oneal, and Michaelene Cox 
also found that “civilizations do not 
defi ne the fault lines along which 
international confl ict occurs.” Instead, 
common values of democracy and 
economic cooperation turn out to 
be more relevant.10 Their research 
also showed that confl icts between 
civilizations did not increase in the 
post-Cold War period. Jonathan 
Benthall claims that the difference 
between values of Islamic and Judaeo-
Christian traditions may not be as great 
as described by Huntington, according 
to his research on Muslim charitable 
practices.11 In the light of these studies, 
it is possible to sum up that, because 
of the fuzziness of the concepts and 
the hypotheses, their refutation by 
empirical research is not surprising.
Admittedly, articles in the social sci-
ences cannot be as precise as in the natu-
ral sciences in its assumptions, meth-
odologies and predictions. However, 
we have certain standards to guide our 
thinking about social realities that sur-
round us. When scientifi c knowledge is 
produced, the necessary measurements 
must accompany it, to let consumers of 
that knowledge judge for themselves if 
it is true or false. This is only possible 
with a certain minimum of clarity and 
consistency. 
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